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This study examined the long-term performance of open market share repurchase announcements made by companies 
listed on the JSE during their reporting periods including 1 July 1999 to 2009. A total of 195 open market share 
repurchase announcements were identified. A maximum outperformance of about 35% was found on day t+550 (about 
two years subsequent to the announcement). After splitting the sample into 'value' (low P/E ratio) and 'growth' shares 
(high P/E ratio), it was found that the outperformance was almost entirely confined to the value portfolio, reaching a 
maximum of about 80% by day t+630 (about two-and-a-halfyears subsequent to the announcement). This study applied a 
more robust research methodology than used in earlier South African research on this topic; it also used an improved 
dataset and extended the research period, compared to other research. The results of this study showed much higher 
positive abnormal returns than were found in earlier international and South African studies. Investors should take 
advantage of the informational value of open market repurchase announcements and the related significant abnormal 
returns to be earned. 
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Introduction 
Share repurchases have globally become an important 
financial tool for listed companies. In the United States of 
America (US), share repurchases by companies, except 
financials and utilities listed on Compustat, equalled 
dividends for the first time in 1998, overtook dividends in 
2005 and widened the margin significantly in 2006 (Dittmar, 
2008: 27). European share repurchases accounted for half of 
the total cash payouts in 2005 and show similar trends to 
those in the US, although repurchases started much later 
than in the US (Von Eije & Megginson, 2008: 348). The 
open market share repurchase method is by far the most 
popular method of repurchase, representing 93% of US 
repurchase value from 1996 to 2004 (Banyi, Dyl & Kahle, 
2008: 460) and representing 90% to 95% of European 
repurchase value in 1997. 
Many studies have been conducted to ascertain the 
motivation for share repurchases. The most commonly 
attributed motive is signalling of the company's shares as 
being undervalued (Dann, 1981; Vermaelen, 1981; Ofer & 
Thakor, 1987). In support of the signalling hypothesis, the 
underreaction hypothesis was postulated by Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995), who found that the 
market treats open market share repurchase programmes 
with scepticism, leading to prices adjusting slowly over 
time. 
Share repurchases in South Africa were only permitted from 
1 July 1999, following the implementation of the Companies 
Amendment Act 37 of 1999 (Republic of South Africa, 
1999). Limited research has been conducted on share 
repurchases by companies listed on the JSE; the most 
notable being that of Daly (2002), Bhana (2007) and Pienaar 
and Krige (2012). The main reason for limited South 
African research on share repurchases is the lack of a 
comprehensive database. The authors of this paper have 
been able to compile a comprehensive database on share 
repurchases by JSE-listed companies for reporting periods 
including 1 July 1999 to 2009. 
In this paper we examine the long-term performance (i.e. the 
underreaction hypothesis) of open market share repurchases 
by JSE-listed companies over the period 1999 to 2009. We 
add value to previous South African research by applying a 
more robust research methodology, using an improved 
dataset and extending the research period. 
Literature review 
Signalling theory 
The explanation most commonly offered in the literature for 
the repurchasing of shares is that corporate managers use 
this action to 'signal' to the market their optimism about 
their company's prospects. The company's management is 
better informed than outside shareholders about the 
company's true value, and this information asymmetry can 
lead to shares being priced below their intrinsic value. Share 
repurchase plans convey a more credible signal than 
60 
repeated verbal or written statements by management that 
company shares are undervalued (Miller & Rock, 1985). 
Vermaelen (1981) examined the price behaviour of shares 
repurchased by companies in the open market. A study of 
243 open market offers (made between 1970 and April 
1978) by 198 US companies found that open market share 
repurchases had a cumulative abnormal share price decline 
of -6,99% from t-60 until t-2; from t-2 to tO, the two-day 
average abnormal share return was 3,37%; and the 
subsequent cumulative abnormal share return decline from 
t+ 3 to t+60 was -1,31%. It was therefore concluded that 
companies repurchasing their shares were signalling 
undervaluation to the market. 
Ikenberry et al. (1995: 183), however, suggested that the 
positive market reaction of approximately 3% which was 
observed in previous studies (V ermaelen, 1981; Lakonishok 
& Vermaelen, 1990; Comment & Jarrell, 1991) was too low. 
They argued that it hardly seemed plausible that managers 
would have the ability to recognise such small valuation 
errors and, also, would choose not to react to such minor 
discrepancies. Ikenberry et al. (1995) therefore postulated 
their underreaction hypothesis, i.e. that the initial market 
reaction is incomplete and that prices adjust slowly over 
time. They studied 1 239 open market share repurchase 
announcements by US companies between 1980 and 1990 
and found a positive immediate return measured from t-2 to 
t+2 of3,54%; and a return similar to the market from t+3 to 
t+ 10. For long-runs over a four-year period after the share 
repurchase announcement, the cumulative abnormal return 
moved from 2,04% after one year to 12,14% after four 
years. For companies with high book-to-market ratios (i.e. 
value shares), the cumulative abnormal returns, over a four-
year period, moved from 4,66% after one year to 45,29% 
after four years. Companies with low book-to-market ratios 
(i.e. growth shares) did not show positive cumulative 
abnormal returns. It was thus concluded that, on average, the 
market underreacts to open market share repurchase 
announcements and that the full impact of share repurchase 
announcements can extend over several years, particularly 
for value shares. 
Notable South African studies on the information-signalling 
hypothesis of open market share repurchases were 
performed by Daly (2002), Bhana (2007) and Pienaar and 
Krige (2012). A recent study by Punwasi (2012) tested only 
the traditional signalling hypothesis. Daly (2002) analysed 
the share returns of 45 JSE-listed companies that made 88 
announcements between 1 July 1999 and 30 September 
2001. Bhana (2007) published the first scientific article in 
South Africa on the same topic, covering the period October 
2000 to March 2003, with a sample comprising 11 7 
repurchase announcements. Pienaar and Krige (2012) 
covered the period October 2000 to December 2007 and 
analysed 113 transactions made by 63 companies. Punwasi 
(2012) covered the period January 2003 to August 2012 and 
analysed 167 announcements made by 62 companies that 
were listed in August 2012 (therefore excluding all 
announcements made by companies that were delisted 
during the target period). Daly's, Pienaar and Krige's as 
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well as Punwasi's samples comprised announcements of 
actual general (or open market) share repurchases, whereas 
Bhana's sample consisted of general (or open market) 
repurchase announcements of intention to repurchase, 
irrespective of whether the repurchases were actually 
executed (Daly, 2002: 39; Bhana, 2007: 27; Pienaar & 
Krige, 2012: 103). The number of announcements of 
intentions to repurchase via general authority holds little 
resemblance to the actual number of repurchases that are 
transacted, because a general offer does not constitute a 
binding commitment. It has become common practice for 
companies to obtain authorisation for general share 
repurchases during annual shareholders' meetings, 
irrespective of whether they have defmite intentions to 
repurchase shares in the open market (Bester, Wesson & 
Hamman, 2010: 50). 
The results of Daly's study (2002) were inconclusive owing 
to the short period under consideration. Bhana (2007) 
confrrmed that the South African market reaction to open 
market share repurchase announcements is similar to that 
experienced in the US. The initial abnormal return between 
t-2 and t+2 was 4,38%; the long-term three-year abnormal 
return was 14,35%; and for value shares the long-term three-
year abnormal return was 32,8%. Pienaar and Krige (2012) 
confrrmed the results of Bhana (2007) with a long-term 
three-year abnormal return of 26,57% for non-resource 
companies. Pienaar and Krige (2012) did not observe a 
conclusive result on value versus growth shares. Punwasi 
(2012: 44) observed a small positive initial abnormal return 
in the two days following the event of 0,51 %. 
The South African regulating framework 
There are two methods of share repurchase available to 
South African companies, namely repurchases under general 
authority (general repurchases) and repurchases under 
specific authority (specific repurchases). General 
repurchases are similar in style to those of American open 
market share repurchases (Daly, 2002: 13). Regulations on 
general (or open market) repurchases are more flexible and 
less cumbersome than specific repurchases, and it is 
expected that companies would show a preference for open 
market repurchases over specific share repurchases. 
Open market repurchases need to be reported by the 
company via the Securities Exchange News Service (SENS) 
of the JSE once it has cumulatively acquired 3% of its initial 
number of issued shares (of that class, as at the date of the 
resolution) and on each 3% thereafter. The announcement 
must contain the following: dates of repurchase of shares; 
highest and lowest price paid; number and value of shares 
repurchased; extent of authority still outstanding by number 
and percentage; source of funds utilised; a statement by 
directors ( confrrming compliance to the liquidity and 
solvency requirements); the effect on earnings per share 
(EPS), headline EPS, net asset value (NA V) and tangible 
NAV per share, and, if applicable, diluted EPS and diluted 
headline EPS; and the date on which the shares will be 
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cancelled and their listing terminated, if applicable. [Section 
11.27 of the JSE Listings Requirements (JSE, 2007)]. 
Companies repurchasing less than the cumulative 3% 
therefore need not announce their open market share 
repurchases. The 3% rule however seems to be interpreted 
as 3% cumulatively per annum by many companies. While 
the official stance of the JSE is that the 3% disclosure 
requirement is not limited to a specific year, it appears that 
JSE sponsors advise their clients that the 3% threshold runs 
from one annual general meeting, at which shareholders 
provide the necessary authorisation, to the next (Crotty, 
2012). The 3% announcement rule on open market share 
repurchases may therefore result in significant 
understatement of actual open market share repurchase 
activities. 
The 3% announcement rule on open market repurchases is 
in contrast with international requirements. Most exchanges 
require immediate disclosure once the repurchases have 
been implemented - either on the day preceding the 
announcement (e.g. in the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, 
Canada and Australia), a week after the repurchase (e.g. in 
France) or at the end of the quarter (e.g. in the US, since 
2004). Prior to 2004, US companies usually only announced 
their intention to repurchase in the financial press. 
(Ginglinger & Hamon, 2007: 919; Kobokoane, 2007: 16-17; 
Mitchell & Dharmawan, 2007: 149) 
Bester et al. (2010) highlighted the fact that the South 
African share repurchase environment differs from the 
international environment and that international studies 
therefore cannot be applied pari passu on South African 
share repurchases. A sample of 33 JSE-listed companies 
were studied over nine years, from July 1999 until their 
reporting periods ending in 2008, to be able to derive 
repurchase behaviours and to identify challenges unique to 
the South African repurchase environment. It was found that 
open market repurchases represent about 61% of total share 
repurchases in value and that only about 49% of open 
market repurchases in value are announced via SENS. While 
this study of 33 companies may not be entirely accurate 
owing to the relatively small data sample, there is a clear 
indication that open market share repurchases are not as 
widely used as in the US and that research based only on 3% 
announcements of open market share repurchases results in 
a significant understatement of actual total share repurchase 
activities. The South African share repurchase environment 
therefore presents unique challenges. 
Data collection and sample selection 
Data collection 
In this study we investigate the long-term performance (i.e. 
the underreaction hypothesis) of open market share 
repurchases by JSE-listed companies for reporting periods 
including 1999 to 2009. None of the financial data sources 
(Reuters, McGregor BFA and 1-Net Bridge) has kept 
detailed records on share repurchase activities for the 11 
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years (1999 to 2009) covered in this study. Of the previous 
related South African studies (Daly, 2002; Bhana, 2007; 
Pienaar & Krige, 2012; Punwasi, 2012), only Daly included 
details of his sample. Daly (2002) analysed the share returns 
of 45 JSE-listed companies that made 88 open market share 
repurchase announcements between 1 July 1999 and 30 
September 2001. Details of repurchase transactions included 
names of companies, dates of SENS announcements and 
values of the repurchases. Daly's report could therefore be 
used as a basis for data collection on announced open 
market share repurchases. Bester (2008) compared share 
repurchases with dividends for industrial companies 
(namely excluding the Basic Materials and Financials 
sectors) over the period July 1999 to June 2007. He verified 
and expanded Daly's dataset to include 121 JSE-listed 
companies making 312 repurchase announcements (open 
market as well as specific) over the period July 1999 to June 
2007. Repurchase details (including names of companies, 
number of SENS announcements, number of shares 
repurchased and value of the repurchases) were published in 
Bester's research report. 
Different approaches can be used to obtain a comprehensive 
dataset on open market repurchases of JSE-listed 
companies. The first approach followed in this study was to 
search SENS announcements of companies' repurchase 
activities as stored in McGregor BFA (product called 
News). Since the format of the SENS announcements has 
been inconsistent over time, the following keywords were 
used to identify the required announcements: 'repurchase' , 
'buy-back', ' buy back', 'buyback' and ' treasury'. Owing to 
the obvious limitation of the incremental 3% SENS 
announcements in respect of open market share repurchases, 
this data collection approach does not reveal the complete 
extent of open market share repurchases in South Africa. 
The authors adopted a significantly more labour-intensive 
approach to determine the actual shares repurchased by 
analysing the annual reports from 1999 to 2009 and noting 
changes in the number of shares issued. We scanned the 
directors' reports, share capital notes to the balance sheets 
and shareholder analyses (or shareholder spreads) of annual 
reports carefully for changes in issued shares, including 
treasury shares held by subsidiaries or share trusts. 
Unfortunately there was no requirement for a separate note 
in the annual report on share repurchase activities during the 
target period, therefore we had to consult different sections 
of the annual report to obtain the repurchase data. 
Companies do not disclose share repurchase activities in a 
consistent manner, which complicates the calculation of 
total share repurchase activities (Bester et al., 201 0: 51; 
Wesson & Hamman, 2011: 33). We, however, managed to 
compile reliable data on share repurchases during the target 
period. (Fortunately, as from 14 January 2013, listed 
companies have been required to disclose all share 
repurchases in a separate note in their annual reports 
[Section 8.63(n) of the Listings Requirements (JSE, 2013)], 
which will benefit future studies on share repurchases.) 
Finally, we followed an extensive verification process to 
ensure that no repurchase activities had been omitted. This 
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process was based on comparing the total share repurchases 
(as obtained from the annual reports) with the announced 
share repurchases (as derived from the SENS 
announcements) to verify that all announcements 
correspond to actual share repurchases as disclosed in the 
annual reports. We could therefore make a distinction (in 
number of shares and rand values) between open market and 
specific share repurchases, as well as between announced 
and unannounced share repurchases. 
Although the data collection process uncovered all open 
market repurchases during the target period, we used only 
the announced open market repurchases in this study. The 
event date is the announcement date (on SENS) of the share 
repurchase. No repurchase date is disclosed by reporting 
entities in their annual reports during the target period and 
therefore unannounced share repurchases do not have an 
event date to be used when testing the underreaction 
hypothesis. 
The open market share repurchase data in this study are an 
improvement on the previous datasets used in South African 
studies on the underreaction hypothesis of open market 
repurchases. In this study we verified all SENS 
announcements to ensure that they represent actual share 
repurchases. 
The following are examples of announcements which were 
excluded: 
• Repeat announcements where companies announce the 
same share repurchase more than once in SENS (this 
study only included the first and actual share 
repurchases); 
• Fraudulent announcements of share repurchases (e.g. 
three announcements by Control Instruments in 2008 
which were uncovered during the annual audit); 
• Announcements of share repurchases which occurred 
subsequent to the publication of the final annual report, 
but before the delisting of the company, and which 
could not be verified with the daily movement in 
number of shares as obtained from McGregor BFA 
(product called Price Data). (All announcements of 
share repurchases by subsidiaries before delisting, but 
subsequent to the final annual report of their holding 
company, were excluded from the dataset as only daily 
movements in the number of holding company shares 
are captured in McGregor BFA - product called Price 
Data.) 
Although many of the SENS announcements on open 
market share repurchases do not include all the information 
as required by section 11.27 of the JSE Listings 
Requirements (JSE, 2007), these announcements were 
included in the dataset for announced open market 
repurchases if enough detail was disclosed to identify the 
date, number of shares and repurchasing entity (i.e. holding 
company or subsidiary) and the announcement represented 
actual repurchases (as discussed above). 
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Sample selection 
The following JSE-listed companies are included in this 
study for reporting periods including 1 July 1999 until the 
2009 year-end of the company: 
• Companies with listed ordinary and/or N-class shares; 
• Companies with the JSE as their primary listing; and 
• Companies listed on the Main Board, except for 
companies listed in the Basic Materials and Financials 
sectors of the JSE. 
We did not treat odd lot offers as share repurchases as they 
had existed prior to 1999. We also excluded companies that 
fell within the sample requirements but were listed for fewer 
than three years. Share trust repurchases were also excluded 
as legal requirements on share repurchases in the 
Companies' Act and JSE Listings Requirements are not 
applicable to share trust repurchases. 
From 1999 to 2009, there were 227 companies (as defined in 
the sample selection) listed on the JSE, of which 87 were 
delisted during the period. We included delisted companies 
(up to the date of their delisting) to ensure a comprehensive 
study of repurchase activities. 
During the target period, 195 open market repurchase 
announcements were made by 69 companies. Appendix 1 
lists the names of the 69 companies that made open market 
share repurchase announcements during their reporting 
periods including 1 July 1999 until their 2009 financial year-
end. Appendix 2 lists the number of open market share 
repurchase announcements per annum (based on reporting 
periods) and the rand values thereof. 
Methodology 
A standard methodology for event studies has been 
established over time (Brown & Warner, 1980; Bowman, 
1983; Madura & Akhigbe, 1995; Bhana, 1998). This 
methodology is broadly applied in this study, with some 
differences as discussed below. 
Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999: 165) note that the analysis of 
long-term abnormal returns is "treacherous". Therefore, an 
important consideration for event studies, and particularly 
for long-term studies, is the choice of benchmark against 
which abnormal returns are estimated. Many event studies 
use a market- or single-parameter CAPM model as the 
benchmark, but this has been shown to be inadequate. In 
particular, the CAPM fails to account for expected returns 
on the basis of company size, as well as growth versus value 
(Fama & French, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1998) and, in the 
South African context, a further consideration is 'resource' 
versus 'non-resource' shares (Van Rensburg 2001; Van 
Rensburg & Robertson, 2003a, 2003b). Accordingly, a 12-
parameter 'style' model to estimate benchmark returns was 
used in this study. Following Mordant and Muller (2003), 
Mutooni and Muller (2007), and Ward and Muller (2010), 
we created 12 ' control portfolios' of shares representing the 
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cross-sectional factors of size, growth/value and 
resources/non-resources - as shown in Table 1. The cross-
sectional factors were established as follows: 
• A company's size was measured by its market 
capitalisation. All the companies listed on the JSE and 
included in the Financial Times and Stock Exchange 
(FTSE)/JSE All Share Index (usually about 160 
companies) were ranked in descending order of market 
capitalisation. The 40 shares with the largest market 
capitalisation constituted the large capitalisation control 
portfolio. Shares with a market capitalisation ranking 
from 41 to 100 constituted the medium capitalisation 
control portfolio, and the remaining 60 shares formed 
the small capitalisation control portfolio. 
• A company was classified as a growth or a value 
investment in terms of its price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio. 
The PIE ratios were calculated and ranked, after which 
the median was determined. All companies with P/E 
ratios above the median were classified as growth and 
the remainder as value. 
• The broad JSE sector groupings were used as criteria to 
decide whether shares represented a 'resource' share or 
not. All mining and non-mining resource shares were 
classified as resources, while the rest of the market was 
classified as non-resources. 
Each share listed on the JSE was placed into one of the 12 
control portfolios, depending on its characteristics. For 
example, Sasol Ltd. would classify as Large, Resource and 
Value or Growth depending on whether its P/E ratio was 
below or above the median P/E ratio at the start of a 
particular quarter. The control portfolios were rebalanced 
every quarter to ensure that changes in share characteristics 
(PIE ratios, market capitalisations, new listings and 
delistings, etc.) were closely tracked over time. Delisted 
shares were included up to the date of termination of 
trading, after which the share price returns of the delisted 
companies were assumed to be zero until the end of the 
quarter. The delisted shares were excluded from the 
following quarter's rebalancing of control portfolios. 
Similarly, the share price returns of newly listed shares were 
included in the following quarter, when the control 
portfolios were rebalanced. 
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Table 1: Control portfolios 
Control Large, medium Value or Resources or 
portfolio or small size growth non-resources 
company company 
SGN Small Growth Non-resources 
SGR Small Growth Resources 
SVN Small Value Non-resources 
SVR Small Value Resources 
MGN Medimn Growth Non-resources 
MGR Medimn Growth Resources 
MVN Medimn Value Non-resources 
MVR Medimn Value Resources 
LGN Large Growth Non-resources 
LGR Lar_g_e Growth Resources 
LVN Lar_g_e Value Non-resources 
LVR Large Value Resources 
We constructed daily equal-weighted indices for each of the 
12 control portfolios using log returns - as summarised in 
Equation 1. 
(1) 
where: 
Rit the equal-weighted share return for portfolio i for 
day t; and 
Pit the equal-weighted share value of portfolio i at 
the end of day t. 
Following Mordant and Muller (2003), we then calculated 
beta coefficients for each share in the event sample by 
regressing each share's monthly log-function share price 
return over the preceding 48-month period against the 
monthly returns of each of the 12 control portfolios for the 
matching period. The result was a regression equation 
(Equation 2) for each selection. We also obtained an alpha 
coefficient for each share from the regression equation and 
included these in the estimation of expected returns, after 
adjusting for daily intervals. Alpha and beta parameters for 
each share in the sample were updated on a rolling monthly 
basis using prior data. 
The control portfolio model measures the expected return of 
share i in period t as the sum of the sensitivity of share i to 
the returns on the 12 control portfolios and a calculated 
daily alpha estimate in period t. This is summarised in 
Equation 2: 
E(Rtt) = at,t + ~i,1SGNt + ~i,2SGRt + ~i,3SVNt 
+ ~i.4SVRt + ~i.s MGNt 
+ ~i,6MGRt + ~i,7MVNt 
+ ~i.sMVRt + ~i,9 LGNt 
+ ~i,10 LGRt + ~i.uLVNt 
+ ~i,12LVRt (2) 
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where: 
E(.R;~ !he expected return on share ion day t; 
"s, the alpha intereept tenn of share ion day t, 
~., •• . ~ ,,12 the beta co efficients on each control 
portfolio return; and 
SGN, .. . SG~ = the log-f\mcti<11 share price rdUmS on each 
of the 12 control portfolios set out in Table 
I on dayt. 
Next we calculated daily abnormal retl.m$ (AAs) in terms of 
Equation 3, and then averaged them across the &ample for 
the event analysis. 
where: 
(3) 
the abnormal retlm of share i in period t; 
!he expected share price renm of share i in 
period tdetermined in terms of 
Equation 2; and 
actual return of share i in period f. 
We calculated performance over an extended period by 
accumulating the average abnormal returns to obtain !he 
ctunulative abnormal return (CA:R) for each share, over the 
event window period. 
Hypothesis testing 
Brown and W amer (1980, 1985) present the most 
commonly used parametric tests to measure significance on 
AAs from event stUdies. McWilliams and McWiniams 
(2000) present an aggreg;~ted z ·test for cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs), provided these are normally distributed. 
Sanger and McConnell (1986), Corrado (1989) and Cowan 
and Sergeant (1996) all offer appropriate non -parametric 
tests. A bootstrapping process to test AAs and CARs for 
signif1Cancc was applied in the present study (Noreen, 
1989). 
Using the daily AAs on each of the shares in !he sample, we 
constructed Monte Carlo-type boot$1rap distributions of 
CA:Rs. This was done by selecting random dates, for each 
company, from the period before and after the actual event 
date (excluding the observations in the event window itsell) 
and calculating 1he CARs. We repeated !he random date 
generation process 200 times to generate a suite of 
distributions for the event window. From this data we 
determined significance levels. The AAs over the event 
period could then also be tested for s ignificance. This 
method of significance testing is sUperior to the t·test in that 
no assumption is made of normality. We used !he bootstrap 
distributions for -60-day CARs, I O·day CA:Rs, 20-day 
CA:Rs, 60-day CARs and 550-day CA:Rs and tested the 
sample CARs for significance. 
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Results 
Figure 1 shows the CARs for the sample over an event 
window from t-60 to t+60. Since the days are measured as 
working days, this represents a period of about three months 
prior to !he announcement date tO and a post-event period of 
abrut three months. We centred the CAlls at day tO, 
aoo•mHlating the ARs backwards 10 t-60 and forwards to 
t+60. We showed the simp I.e avaage of the CARs, as well 
as the effect of weighting each observation as the value of 
the repurchase as a pe:rccntage of !he market capitalisation 
of the company. 
-.. ... . . . • • 
Figure 1: Average CARs for share repurchase 
announcements 
• • • 
From Figure 1 we observed various fluctuations for the 
equal-weighted sample. Prior to the announcement date, !he 
CAlls remained marginally below zero at about ·1 %. ln the 
days surrounding the event itself, t·3 to t+3, we observed a 
small increase of about 1%. ln the period following the 
announcement, from t+ 10 to t+22, the CA:Rs declined a 
further 2%. From about t+20 until about t+SO the CAlls are 
steady at about ·2% and appreciate slowly, ending at about 
0'~ on t+60. We observed very little difference in the 
weighted samplecoiq>Med 10 the equal -weightedsample. 
To obtain a better idea of the long-term effects, we repeated 
the ana lysis over a rri>ch longer event window. from t -60 to 
t+720, that is apprOltimately three months prior to the 
announcement, \mill three ~rs after the announcement 
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:Figure 2 : Long-term CARs for sha:renpurehase 
announcements 
ln Figure 2 we were able to see the long-tenn effects, and 
we observed that from about t+50 the CARs sttadily 
increased to about 3 5% at abol.¢ tt-600 before the trend 
dissipattd for the equal-weighted u.r~ le. ln the weighted 
sa"l'le the CAAs foUowed a simila.r pattem, but increased 
to about 48% at about t+550. Thereafter the trend was 
almost flat. 
To test for signir.eance in the CARs, a Monte Carlo analysis 
was conducted on the equal-weighted sample using random 
dates, as described earlier. Figwe 3 shows the results, with 
the maxirrtun, median, minirriun, and the 1Oth and 90th 
pereartiles plotted. 
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:Figure 3: Confidence lim.its around the equal.-weie)'lted 
sample CARs 
From :Figure 3 it can be observed that the sample C~ 
remained bounded within the I Oth and 90th percentiles until 
about t+80. Thereafter equal-weighted sample CAAs 
remained significantly higher than the maximum values 
obtained in the bootstrap distributions. 
Table 2 shows the relevant statistics for the sigrsificance 
tests (all of whieh were conducted on the equal-weighted 
data set). 
6S 
Tabl& 2 : Significance t&St ruulls 
E•entdate t-60 tO tt-10 1-t'lO tt-60 MSO 
Mclllb Ca-lo 2,41 0 ,35 1,24 1,34 1,19 6,(11 
maxin'llm% 
Monto Ca-lo -2,43 -0,52 -1,69 -2,77 -4,11 -6,46 
miltinmm % 
Monto Ca-lo -0,10 -0,0& -0,0& -0,&2 -1,07 0,04 
mwt% 
CAR Y>lue% 098 .1) 08 048 -I 9S -0 35 2918 
Percentile% 7000 so 00 7000 IS 1)1) 6000 lOll 00 
From Table 2 we observed at t-60 the CAR for the sample 
was 0,98%, whieh was around the 70th percentile of the 
distribution generated by the 200 random simulations 
indicating that the decline from t-60 to 111 was no; 
sipficant. The CAR at tO was -0,08%, and we concluded 
that this was not signif.eantly different from the Monte 
Carlo mean of -0,08% using simulationS. 
At t+IO, tt-20 and t+60 our results were also not statistically 
s ignificant. However, at t+550 our sample CAR was 
29,18%, whereas our highest simulation result for CAAs at 
t+SSO was 6,07'A>. We concluded that there was a significant 
positive ou1performance in the share repurchase sample over 
the 550 trading days following the announcement. 
Finally, we split the sample into two equal-sized portfolios 
by ranking the companies by their l>IE ratio at the 
announcement date, the low l>IE sample representing a value 
portfolio and the high !>IE sample representing growth. 
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:Figore 4: CARs for thuamplesplit into value and 
grawth p n tfelios 
From Figure 4 we observed a similar pattern for the CAAs 
of the value and growth portfolios until abol.¢ t+40. 
Thereafter the CAAs for the value portfolio grew rapidly 
over the next three years to about 80% by t+630, before the 
trend subsided. The CAAs for the growth portfolio remained 
llat, around O'A>, trending stigjrtly upwards from t+420 to 
about 10o/o at t+720. 
We also ranked companies by their market-to-book ratio at 
the announcement date. The market-to -book ratio used 
represents the ratio at the year-end preceding the 
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announcement date and was calculated by dividing the 
market capitalisation (as obtained from McGregor BFA -
product called Price Data) by the ordinary shareholders' 
capital (as obtained from McGregor BFA- product called 
Financial Statements). A market-to-book ratio below 1 
represents a value portfolio and a market-to-book ratio 
above 1 represents a growth portfolio. Similar results to the 
PIE ratio ranking were obtained: CARs for the value 
portfolio grew rapidly from announcement date to just 
above 60% by t+600, after which the trend subsided; the 
CARs for the growth portfolio remained flat, around 0%, 
trending slightly upwards from t+240 to about 20% at 
t+720. 
Conclusions 
We identified 195 open market share repurchase 
announcements over the period 1 July 1999 to the 2009 
financial year-ends of JSE-listed companies included in this 
study. Following the control portfolio event study method of 
Ward and Muller (2010), we estimated daily CARs for the 
sample using an event window of 60 trading days 
(approximately three months) prior to the announcement 
date to 720 trading days (about three years) after the event. 
We conducted the analysis using an equal-weighted sample 
and a sample in which the observations were weighted by 
the value of the share repurchase as a percentage of the 
company's market capitalisation. Our results (which were 
similar for both samples) showed that in the three months 
prior to the announcement of a share repurchase, the shares 
were relatively stable with a negative CAR of between -1% 
and 0%. In the period around the event date, the CARs 
increased by about 1 %, but this was not statistically 
significant. Between t+ 1 0 and t+ 22 the CARs dropped by a 
further 2%, but this again was not statistically significant. 
From about t+50, however, we observed a steady increase in 
the CARs, which reached a maximum of about 35% (for the 
equal-weighted sample) and 48% (for the weighted sample) 
outperformance on about t+550. Using bootstrap 
distributions, we found the outperformance at t+550 to be 
highly significant. The fact that the weighted sample 
outperforms the equal-weighted sample indicates that the 
higher the percentage of shares repurchased as a percentage 
of market capitalisation, the stronger the effect. 
We repeated the analysis after splitting the sample into 
'value' (low PIE) and ' growth' (high P/E) shares and found 
that the outperformance was almost entirely confined to the 
value portfolio, reaching a maximum of about 80% by t+630 
(after about two-and-a-half years), before the trend subsided. 
While this raised the possibility that we were simply 
measuring a value effect in our analysis, we dismissed this 
as unlikely, given that we had controlled for this in the 
construction of our control portfolios to estimate the ARs. 
This study supports the findings of previous studies on the 
positive long-term performance of open market share 
repurchases. A US study by Ikenberry et al. (1995) reported 
abnormal returns of about 12% over a four-year period, with 
value shares showing abnormal returns of about 45% over a 
four-year period. Previous South African research (Bhana, 
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2007; Pienaar & Krige, 2012) also supported abnormal 
returns over the long term: Bhana (2007) reported abnormal 
returns of about 14% over a four-year period, with value 
shares showing abnormal returns of about 33% over a four-
year period; while Pienaar and Krige (2012) reported 
abnormal returns of about 27% over a three-year period, but 
did not observe a conclusive difference between value 
versus growth shares. 
This study applied a more robust research methodology than 
was applied in previous studies on the long-term 
performance of open market share repurchases. The study 
also used an improved dataset over an extended research 
period, when compared to prior South African research on 
the long-term performance of open market share 
repurchases. This study found a much higher positive 
abnormal return of about 35% after about two years (after 
which the trend flattened) than had been observed in prior 
international and local research. The positive abnormal 
return was mainly confined to value shares, which showed 
an abnormal return of about 80% after about two-and-a-half 
years, before subsiding. 
This study therefore confirms that investment decisions 
based on open market share repurchase announcements, 
especially in respect of value shares, have earned significant 
abnormal returns for a period of about three years 
subsequent to the announcement date. Investors should 
therefore take advantage of the informational value of open 
market share repurchase announcements. 
Future studies should address comparative assessments of 
different return estimation models (e.g. the standard CAPM 
model, a model incorporating a momentum factor in the 
control portfolios and a model applying value proxies other 
than P/E ratios in the value/growth control portfolios) on the 
market underreaction to open market share repurchases on 
the JSE. 
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Apendices 
Appendix 1 
Companies making open market share repurchase 
announcements 
Company name* Number of 
announce men 
ts 
1 AdaptiT Holdings Ltd 5 
2 Adcorp Holclings Ltd 1 
3 AFGRI Ltd 2 
4 Astral Foods Ltd 3 
5 Astrapak Ltd 1 
6 Aveng Ltd 1 
7 A VI Ltd 2 
8 Barloworld Ltd 3 
9 Brandcorp Holdings Ltd 4 
10 Business Connexion Group Ltd 6 
11 Cash build Ltd 1 
12 Chester Investment Holdings Ltd 1 
13 Clicks Group Ltd 9 
14 Compu-Clearing_ Outsourcing Ltd 5 
15 Connection Group Holdings Ltd 2 
16 Digicore Holdings Ltd 2 
17 Distribution and Warehousing Network Ltd 3 
18 Edgars Consolidated Stores Ltd 4 
19 Ellerine Holclings Ltd 1 
20 EnviroServ Holdings Ltd 2 
21 EOH Holdings Ltd 1 
22 Excellerate Holclings Ltd 1 
23 Faritec Holdings Ltd 2 
24 F oschini Ltd 3 
25 Grindrod Ltd 6 
26 Hudaco Industries Ltd 1 
27 Illiad Africa Ltd 6 
28 Imperial Holdings Ltd 2 
29 Inmins Ltd 2 
30 Invicta Holdings Ltd 4 
31 IST Group Ltd 1 
32 JD Group Ltd 1 
33 KayDav Group Ltd 2 
34 Kelly Group Ltd 1 
35 LA Group Ltd 10 
36 Lewis Group Ltd 3 
37 MalbakLtd 3 
38 Mustek Ltd 4 
39 Mvelephanda Group Ltd 2 
40 Ozz Ltd 3 
41 Paracon Holdings Ltd 2 
42 Phumelela Gaming and Leisure Ltd 1 
43 Pick n Pay Stores Ltd 1 
44 Pinnacle Technology Holclings Ltd 1 
45 Pretoria Portland Cement Company Ltd 2 
46 Primedia Ltd 2 
47 Primeserv Group Ltd 4 
48 Profurn Ltd 1 
49 Remgro Ltd 2 
50 Reunert Ltd 3 
51 Sasani Ltd 1 
52 Sasol Ltd 5 
53 SecureData Holclings Ltd 1 
54 Spur Corporation Ltd 1 
55 Steinhoff International Holdings Ltd 1 
56 Super Group Ltd 3 
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57 Telkom SA Ltd 6 
58 The Bidvest Group Ltd 1 
59 The House of Busby Ltd 5 
60 The Laser Group Ltd 2 
61 Tiger Brands Ltd 1 
62 Tourism Investment Corporation Ltd 1 
63 Transpaco Ltd 1 
64 Truworths International Ltd 13 
65 UCS Group Ltd 4 
66 Unitrans Ltd 1 
67 Universal Industries Corporation Ltd 8 
68 Value Group Ltd 3 
69 W oolworths Holdings Ltd 2 
Total number of announcements 195 
*Company names as per Profile's Stock Exchange Handbook, February 
2010- May 2010 (Profile Media, 2010) 
Appendix 2 
Open market share repurchase announcements per 
annum ( based on reportin~ periods) 
Year Number of % Rand values % 
announcements 
1999 0 0,00 0 0,00 
2000 14 7 18 2 461 253 199 7 19 
2001 38 19 49 1 293 448 616 3 78 
2002 29 14,87 1 917 650 818 5,61 
2003 31 15 90 1207763113 3 53 
2004 7 3,59 1 074 200 050 3,14 
2005 13 6,67 3 266 258 735 9,55 
2006 12 6,15 3 783 765 734 11 ,06 
2007 12 6,15 6 482 967 599 18,95 
2008 28 14,36 12 033 931 555 35,18 
2009 11 5,64 687 889 675 2,01 
195 100 00 34 209 129 094 100,00 
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